Anonymity Versus Privacy in a Control Society by Melis, Rachel
Melis, Rachel. “Anonymity Versus Privacy in a Control Society,” in “Information/Control: Control 
in the Age of Post-Truth,” eds. James Lowry, Stacy Wood, and Andrew J Lau. Special issue, Journal 
of Critical Library and Information Studies 2, no. 1 (2019). 
 
ISSN: 2572-1364 
 
Article 
Anonymity Versus Privacy in a Control 
Society 
Rachel Melis 
ABSTRACT 
Society is becoming increasingly more securitized with surveillance technologies having 
entered a phase of ubiquity, with their components built into many of our daily digital 
devices. The default state of tracking, monitoring, and recording has fundamentally 
changed our social and communicative environments. Through the lens of surveillance, 
everything we do and say can be potentially categorized as a “threat.” Our technological 
devices become the means by which social control becomes informationalized. A 
common tool of resistance against these pervasive surveillance practices takes the form 
of arguing for greater privacy protections to be implemented through information privacy 
and data protection laws. However, beyond the complexity of the privacy discourse itself, 
there are diverse information environments not easily parsed by law where the tension 
between transparency and secrecy complicates privacy practices.  
The main purpose of this article is conceptual. I consider what the practice of 
anonymity can offer that privacy does not. From a legal perspective, highlighting the 
nuances between privacy and anonymity helps us to understand the extent to which our 
speech and behaviors are becoming increasingly more constrained in the digital 
environment. In cultural and social contexts, privacy and anonymity often connote 
differing values; privacy is commonly considered a moral virtue, while anonymity is often 
maligned and associated with criminal or deviant behavior. In contrast to this 
understanding, I argue that anonymity should be reconsidered in light of the deterioration 
of privacy considerations as privacy practices are reframed as contractual resources that 
are co-opted by both the market and the state. Anonymity, more broadly construed as a 
mode of resistance to surveillance practices, allows for a more flexible, consistent, and 
collective means of ensuring civil liberties remain intact.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Society is becoming increasingly more securitized with surveillance technologies having 
entered a phase of ubiquity; they are built-in components of many of our daily 
technological devices. The default of tracking, monitoring, and recording has 
fundamentally changed our social and communicative environments. Through the lens of 
surveillance, everything we do and say can be potentially categorized as “threat.” Through 
the use of our technologies, our lives have become transparent to both market players 
and law enforcement. Some resistance to this state of surveillance has taken the form of 
privacy protections implemented through information privacy law. 
 The main purpose of this article is conceptual. I consider the means by which 
privacy has become a matter of informationalized debate which revolves around the 
tension between a need for security and the need for freedom. I argue that privacy 
advocacy has not been successful in effecting a balance in the asymmetrical power 
relations that would lead to an empowering of the citizen (or consumer). Further, after 
considering what the practice of anonymity can offer that privacy does not, I argue that 
anonymity should be broadly construed as its own form of resistance to surveillance 
practices.  
Even though they are understood as complementary concepts, in the legal realm 
privacy and anonymity differ in terms of the way they are perceived as resisting dominant 
views of what our information environments mean. From a legal perspective, highlighting 
the nuances between privacy practice and anonymous practice helps us to understand 
the extent to which our speech and behaviors become constrained, especially in the 
digital environment. In cultural and social contexts, privacy and anonymity can be seen to 
connote differing values; privacy is commonly considered a moral virtue, while anonymity 
is often maligned and associated with criminal or deviant behavior. 
Notions of privacy and anonymity are commonly discussed in reference to the 
individual. With only a few exceptions, privacy is rarely studied on a collective scale, and 
anonymity is often considered only in relation to privacy protections. As privacy 
increasingly becomes a resource that is co-opted by both the market and the political 
sphere, anonymity allows for a more flexible, consistent, and collective means of ensuring 
civil liberties remain intact. In a culture of surveillance, privacy as it has been understood 
thus far, can no longer be invoked as feasible protection against an increasingly datafied 
existence.1  
The “information revolution” as Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier 
understand it, is one whereby data becomes the new currency. They believe that the 
 
1  Datafication is the effect of putting information into a “quantified format so it can be tabulated 
and analysed.” Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That 
Will Transform the Way We Live, Work, and Think (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2013), 78.  
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move towards data knowledge and investment is both a benign and necessary outcome 
of our digital environments, and that the quantification of everything is inevitable.2 In this 
view, the individual exercises economic control over their data, supporting and propping 
up the (arbitrary) numerical systems of value and worth, quantifying the self. The 
increasingly popular viewpoint that more data is always better, even necessary, or that 
more data helps explain, helps to know, is a byproduct of particular information ecologies 
we inhabit, and it is influenced by a rhetoric of transparency whose logic marks a process 
of visibility. But as Barnard-Wills argues, this process is also marked by radical contingency 
and it can change; the outcome is not inevitable as some would like to believe.3 The 
defense against the process of datafication in the social and cultural spheres, however, 
cannot be an individual response; resistance must take place collectively if we strive for 
autonomy in our digital environment. 
TRANSPARENCY AS GOVERNMENTALITY: VISIBILITY, DISCIPLINE, CONTROL 
As the critical study of transparency gains momentum in the wave of e-government 
initiatives in the U.S., Canada, and Europe,4 transparency warrants special attention in 
examining the ways in which openness, sharing, and the erosion of privacy are linked. 
Many government initiatives mobilize transparency to invoke access to open, available, 
unfettered and free information flows.5  Transparency is the means by which people 
become informed, responsible and democratically enabled citizens. Transparency, it 
would follow, keeps governments accountable to their people as state processes become 
easier to understand and therefore, presumably, easier to act on. In reality, however, the 
call for transparency takes many forms and both expectations and outcomes vary 
according to circumstances and context.  
The media theorist Felix Stalder suggests that studying the forms of transparency 
in terms of the production of social relationships reveals a political dynamic of 
empowerment and control.6 He recognizes two paradigms of transparency that he sees 
operating simultaneously. Whereas the first paradigm sees transparency directed at 
 
2  Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big Data, 73-97. 
3  David Barnard-Wills, “The Non-Consensual Hallucination: The Politics of Online Privacy,” in 
Media, Surveillance, and Identity, ed. Andre Jansson and Miyase Christensen (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2014), 165-82. 
4  See, for example, the special issue on “Transparency” in the European Journal of Social Theory 
18, no. 2 (2015). 
5  Hans Krouse Hansen, “Numerical Operations, Transparency Illusions and the Datafication of 
Governance,” European Journal of Social Theory 18, no. 2 (2015): 203-20.  
6  Felix Stalder, “The Fight over Transparency: From a Hierarchical to a Horizontal Organization,” 
Open 22 (2011): 8-22. 
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government in order to create accountability to the public, there is a second demand for 
transparency which comes from within neoliberal theory, and has as its goal the reduction 
of uncertainty. As such, this form of transparency is directed towards market participants 
whose transactional behavior can be tracked, collected, aggregated, and mobilized to 
predict future behavior and expectations, with the goal to reduce economic risk in an 
increasingly unstable and unpredictable global marketplace.7 Transparency for those in 
power leads to accountability; for the public, however, it tends to lead to privacy 
violations, where the reduction of uncertainty requires free and open data flows.  
 The current and growing obsession with big data analytics, and the enthusiastic 
adoption of automated services, open social networking and sharing lead to additional, 
more profound considerations for the state of society, such as the efficacy of online civic 
engagement and discourse. 8  In open governance transparency (in terms of 
communication) defines the default relationship between individual and state. 
Technological tools for transparency, such as online databases of decontextualized 
government data, promise the speed, immediacy, and availability of information, but not 
the possibility of a dialogue concerning the information being released. Data alone does 
not make meaning and is not enough to “inform” citizens. This form of transparency, 
instead of allowing for the exchange of information, reduces political relations to mere 
transmission and effects.9 Data divorced from dialogue becomes the reasoning function 
of the relationship between the state and the people. 
Transparency in the service of reducing uncertainty functions inversely in the 
relationship between the state and the people. Data gathering and processing, while 
necessary for the functioning of the bureaucratic state, and commonly accepted as the 
regular work of governing populations, renders citizens visible in ways beyond the initial 
“work” that information processing does; 10  namely streamlining data-subjects, 
homogenizing the “other,” and storing, aggregating, and linking data fragments that can 
later masquerade as knowledge. And society, it would seem, accepts this without 
question. Indeed, the so-called “big data revolution,” and the hype surrounding it, is 
 
7  Stalder, “The Fight Over Transparency.” See also Mark Andrejevic, “We Are All ‘Lab Rats’ 
Online,” Interview with PBS. February 18, 2014. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/media/generation-like/mark-andrejevic-we-are-all-
lab-rats-online/ 
8  Antoinette Rouvroy, “The End(s) of Critique: Data Behaviourism Versus Due Process,” in 
Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy 
of Technology, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013): 
143-167.   
9  Mark Fenster, “Transparency in Search of a Theory,” European Journal of Social Theory 18, no. 
2 (2015): 154.  
10 Julie Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). See 
Chapter 5. See also Rouvroy, “The End(s) of Critique.”  
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testament to a general acceptance and even enthusiastic adoption and perpetuation of 
data primacy.11 
One immediate effect of the primacy of data in governing populations is 
recognizable in the shift from a disciplinary mode of population control based on panoptic 
visibility to softer, elusive, less visible modes of control. Without superseding discipline12 
(or disciplinary power) the work that big data does is both insidious and coercive, and 
depends in many ways on the evolution of disciplinary regimes.  
Gilles Deleuze, in his short but influential essay of 1982, “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control,” describes the control society as an extension of disciplinary modes 
of governance; here modulation is one of the salient features of a database-oriented, 
networked society. Deleuze’s critique considers the power relations and affective 
capacities of ICTs and how they order and control our informational environments and 
influence our relations. The control society thesis can be understood as a continuum of 
both disciplinary and modular flows.13  
Influenced by Deleuze, and following Michel Foucault’s study of the ways in which 
disciplinary power works on the subject, David Savat argues that contemporary 
modulatory power has grave consequences for personal privacy in service of identity 
formation.14 As a product of the control society, the informationalized “subject” is a de-
identification. Datafication is a result of modulatory flows which fragment the individual 
into code. Savat argues that through simulation, sorting, and sampling, modulatory power 
functions through the “recognition of patterns,” “anticipation of activity,” “organization 
of antithesis,” and “programming of code.” 15  Where disciplinary power aims at 
constructing an individual, modular power fractures and splits the individual.16  
Even though Savat’s analysis does not focus on surveillance, it is the culture of 
surveillance, as a mode of real-time transparency, that remains the mechanistic 
environment of modulation which has serious consequences for the person under the 
law. From a Deleuzian control perspective, transparency regimes are also surveillance 
regimes; being reciprocal concepts, transparency and surveillance as regimes, share the 
goal of visibility.  What form visibility takes, however, is determined by the sociotechnical 
 
11 “[Data] is the oil of the information economy,” Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big Data, 16. 
12 Stephen J. Collier, “Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government Beyond 
Governmentality,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (2009): 78-108. 
13 David Savat, Uncoding the Digital: Technology, Subjectivity and Action in the Control Society 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
14 David Savat, “Deleuze’s Objectile: From Discipline to Modulation,” in Deleuze and New 
Technology, ed. Mark Poster and David Savat (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 
45-62. 
15 Savat, Uncoding the Digital. 
16 Savat, Uncoding the Digital. 
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relations that determine the context of data disclosure.17 Modulatory flows can “create” 
or “predict” certain kinds of subjects for whom it becomes impossible to guarantee 
minimal rights and autonomy. 
Antoinette Rouvroy, in her analysis of the effects of what she calls “algorithmic 
governmentality,” describes the consequences that excessive information processing can 
have on the autonomy of the person, 
 
Understanding that the target of algorithmic governmentality is the inactual, 
potential dimensions of human existence, its dimensions of virtuality, the 
conditional mode of what people ‘could’ do, their potency or agency, allows us 
to understand what is at stake here: a deprivation which does not have as its 
opposite the possession of oneself.18 
 
Targeting one’s potential to act is both restrictive and prescriptive. Algorithmic 
governmentality is thus both disciplinary and modulatory as it plays out in big data 
projections. It is disciplinary because it restricts present conduct; modulatory because it 
prescribes the future conduct of conduct.19 These fits and starts of the modulatory mode 
of power also create an environment or condition of constant interpellation.20 Calling 
subjects into discrete data positions aids in the increasing decentering of attention at the 
individual level, while at the algorithmic level these discrete data attention points remain 
invisible to human detection and calculation.21  
PRIVACY MODELS 
When conceptualizing privacy across disciplines, we see a loose division of theories of 
privacy into either “rights-based” or “interests-based” approaches. 22  Theorists who 
model privacy as a right, understand privacy as a form of secrecy (surveillance model). 
They invoke a traditional mode of privacy as it pertains to the physical body, and in terms 
 
17 Deborah G. Johnson and Kent A. Wayland, “Surveillance and Transparency as Sociotechnical 
Systems of Accountability,” in Surveillance and Democracy, ed. Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas 
Samatas (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010): 19-33.  
18 Rouvroy, “The End(s) of Critique,” 159. 
19 See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. 
G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and D. Murphy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 87-104. 
20 Mark Poster, The Second Media Age (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995). See the chapter on 
“Databases as Discourse, or Electronic Interpellations.” 
21 Mark Poster, The Second Media Age. 
22 Herman T. Tavani, “Philosophical Theories of Privacy: Implications for an Adequate Online 
Privacy Policy,” Metaphilosophy 38, no. 1 (2007): 1-22. 
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of intimacy associated with confidentiality. Theorists approaching privacy in terms of 
interests, understand privacy as a form of control that is often exercised in situations that 
involve data about a person. This contemporary meaning of privacy as it pertains to 
individual data protection is associated with choice (the capture model).23  When we 
understand privacy to be more closely associated with secrecy, we are concerned with 
passive freedoms; freedom from invasion. As a passive measure, privacy is the “right to 
be left alone.”24 When we understand privacy to be more closely associated with control, 
we are concerned with active freedoms; freedom to choose (who gets access to data 
about us) and freedom to be (who we decide to be as represented by our data). This active 
measure of privacy entails identity, the “right to be oneself.”25 The latter view is prevalent 
in contemporary informational privacy discourse where personal information is data 
protected as property.26 In this article, the term privacy, unless otherwise qualified is 
understood as informational privacy.27 
Understanding privacy as a mechanism of control has less to do with the idea of 
access to the physical person (of the body, in public) and more to do with individual data 
ownership and controlling access to the data. Control in this case has less to do with 
secrecy and solitude, aspects of a traditional physical approach to privacy, and more to 
do with transactions. These transactions can be social interactions as in publicity and 
exposure in social networking or financial transactions in terms of consumer behavior. 
Though the role of choice is central to an interests-based understanding of privacy, choice 
becomes a problematic assumption when questions arise around how to define the kinds 
of information we can control, and how to determine how much control we can have in 
different environments. These questions, among others, become central to critiques of 
 
23 Philip Agre, “Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy,” Information Society 10, no. 2 
(1994), 101-127. 
24 This comes to us from the seminal ruling of Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” 
Harvard Law Review 193, no. 4 (1890): 193-220. 
25 Luciano Floridi, “Four Challenges for a Theory of Informational Privacy,” Ethics and Information 
Technology 8 (2006): 109-19. See also Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet, “The Right to 
Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the 
Importance of Privacy for Democracy,” in Reinventing Data Protection? ed. Poullet Gutwirth, 
De Hert, de Terwangne and Nouwt (Dordecht: Springer, 2009), 45-76. 
26 Christian Fuchs, “Towards an Alternative Concept of Privacy,” Journal of Information, 
Communication & Ethics in Society 9, no. 4 (2011): 220-37; Julie Cohen, Configuring the 
Networked Self (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012). 
27 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Privacy Revisited: A Global Perspective on the Right to Be Forgotten 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2016): 48. There are three modes of privacy that are 
categorized for the purposes of legal and constitutional protection: personal, territorial, and 
informational. 
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privacy.28 The prevailing view of personal information as property is responsible for the 
push towards greater data availability and collection, instrumentalized through privacy 
notices demanding consent.29 
Privacy notices are generally ineffective in communicating the possible risks to 
individuals’ privacy. A number of experiments conducted by Alessandro Acquisti and his 
colleagues have brought to light some of the prevailing reasons for the apparent privacy 
paradox.30 In terms of decision-making, cognitive biases affect the interpretation and 
effective understanding of privacy notices and agreements and lead to actions that would 
otherwise contradict the beliefs or intentions of the participants. Furthermore, “notice 
and consent” systems are fraught with inconsistencies. Research studies have 
demonstrated that the system is a poor mechanism of controlled access if the goal is to 
empower the individual user in his or her decisional framework.31 Rather, because these 
systems are incapable of addressing future uses of personal data, they cannot adequately 
adjust for potential consequences. As Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier argue, when the 
value of data is more likely in its secondary use and in perpetuity, this ostensible privacy 
control mechanism is no longer suited to the potentiality of data use, ownership, and 
sharing.32 And as Solove believes, “consent is virtually meaningless in many contexts. 
When people give consent, they must often consent to a total surrender of control over 
their information.”33 In other words, consent equates to a loss of control, the complete 
inverse of the intended consequences of privacy enhancing policies. The ostensible effect 
of these types of systems regulating our online informational transactions is the illusion 
of power or control (we “willingly” agree to the terms of service) while real empowerment 
is undermined by the nature of the contractual form.  
Studying the relationship between consumer attitudes towards privacy and data 
behavior further reveals a form of responsibilization determining the relationship 
 
28 Tavani, “Philosophical Theories,” 7. 
29 This process has been accelerated with the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Directive (GDPR) which requires that all websites collecting data or tracking users in the EU 
display a notice detailing the collection practice and subsequent use of the data. In most cases, 
if the user does not consent to the practices, there is no moving forward through the site.  
30 Allessandro Acquisti, Idris Adjerid, and Laura Brandimarte, “Gone in 15 Seconds: The Limits of 
Privacy Transparency and Control,” IEEE Security & Privacy (July/August 2013): 72-74. 
31 Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, “On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent,” 
Proceedings of the Engaging Data Forum on the Application and Management of Personal 
Information (2009). http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf 
32 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big Data. 
33 Daniel J. Solove, “Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy,” Stanford Law Review 53, no. 6 (2001): 1427. 
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between the “data subject” or “data publics” and data disclosure practices.34 Elements of 
control, whether illusory or real, fail to account for the dangers and risk of data disclosure 
which implicitly puts the onus of privacy expectations, protections, and accountability on 
the individual rather than on the organizations collecting the data.35 In data gathering, 
the whole becomes greater than its parts. Information abuses are identifiable and take 
on greater importance when viewed from a collective perspective. The ownership of 
personal information and thus the right to control it, as in decide to whom and when one 
may sell or trade their own information, creates an artificially commodified value for 
personal information. 
Modelling privacy is one way of getting at the discourse of power and issues of 
control. If privacy functions as a commodity, an interests-based model is responsible for 
the legislation of privacy as a data-driven positive freedom to control who owns the 
information and how it is used. In this case, the person trades or sells personal 
information in order to access a service more efficiently or to gain an advantage otherwise 
withheld from those who are less willing to sell their data. If privacy functions as a right 
to be “left alone” (or remain unseen), this leads to a secrecy or rights-based model for 
legislating privacy as a negative freedom where the burden of proof lies on defining or 
recognizing “harm.”36 Confidentiality and trust would figure prominently in this approach 
to privacy. Nevertheless, the above understandings of privacy take the individual as the 
level of analysis; neither of these regulatory approaches consider the benefits or effects 
of privacy breaches to society as a whole. 
We must recognize the importance of a collective approach to the protection of 
privacy, instead of focusing on individual interests.37 This requires us to concern ourselves 
with blanket data collection and processing to the extent that a breach or invasion 
constitutes not only a breach of individual privacy, but involves unlimited other 
individuals. Much commercial and publicly available social data collection exists in 
relation to multiple individuals.38 In this context, one’s privacy control settings do nothing 
to protect oneself from a friend’s or another’s more lax or open privacy settings.39 
It is in this complexity that I would suggest anonymity as the mode of analysis in 
group information sharing, trust, control, and power relations. Not to replace the concept 
 
34 Clare Birchall, “‘Data.gov-in-a-box’: Delimiting Transparency,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 18, no. 2 (2015): 190-91. 
35 Clare Birchall, “‘Data.gov-in-a-box.’” 
36 Philip Agre calls these the “surveillance” and “capture” models of privacy. 
37 Cohen, Configuring, 8. 
38 Social networks such as Facebook are the obvious case in point. 
39 David Wills and Stuart Reeves, “Facebook as a Political Weapon: Information in Social 
Networks,” British Politics 4, no. 2 (2009): 265-281. See also Felix Stadler, “Autonomy and 
Control in the Era of Post-Privacy,” Notes & Nodes (blog), June 14, 2010, 
http://felix.openflows.com/node/143. 
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of privacy, nor to minimize the work that privacy advocacy does, but to reorient and shift 
the emphasis from the individual to the collective by focusing on the relational aspects of 
anonymity in order to demonstrate how personal data control is illusory, and to trouble 
the belief that privacy protection can control the flow of information.  
PHILOSOPHY OF ANONYMITY 
Anonymity is generally understood on a spectrum of controlled visibility from one end of 
identifiability to the other end of unknowability. Although in common parlance, 
anonymity closely aligns with secrecy and privacy,40 anonymity can be understood as a 
means of undermining the transparency imperative more effectively when exercised and 
mobilized collectively. Anonymity is a tool of resistance to visibility and trackability, 
without compromising participatory communication, because it can allow for a form of 
presence that may be seen but not datafied. As such, anonymity is politicized because it 
reverses data responsibilization by deliberately denying the preemptive expectation to 
share (here as an active role) data. Anonymity plays a subtle but differentiating role in the 
struggle for privacy against data mining and tracking.  Anonymity abides by the dictum 
“information wants to be free,” by respecting access and rejecting the information 
market; through practices of anonymity, the tension between making information 
available and protecting one’s privacy is alleviated and the incentive to commodify 
personal information is reduced, if not wholly eliminated.  
Data exists. As soon as we do anything digitally, we generate data. These data 
traces we generate can be intentional or unintentional. They can be personally 
identifiable or anonymous. However, we can approach this anonymity in various ways. It 
is useful to consider anonymous practices in terms of the relations established between 
bodies and machines. Anonymity can mean nonidentifiability, approached as the 
“noncoordinatability of traits,”41 untraceability,42 or unreachability.43 Depending on the 
approach, civil liberties can be impacted in different ways. 
 
40 Julie Ponesse, “Navigating the Unknown: Towards a Positive Conception of Anonymity,” The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 51, no. 3 (2013): 324. 
41 Kathleen A. Wallace, “Anonymity,” Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1999): 23-35.  
42 Michael A. Froomkin, “Anonymity in the Balance,” in Digital Anonymity and the Law: Tensions 
and Dimensions, ed. C. Nicoll, J.E.J. Prins, and M.J.M. van Dellen (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2003). 
43 Helen Nissenbaum, “The Meaning of Anonymity in an Information Age,” The Information 
Society 15, no. 2 (1999): 141-144. 
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Anonymity is variously associated with privacy as its enabler44 or as its nemesis,45 
but often the two are conceived of in synonymous ways. In some cases, when the 
discourse surrounds freedom of speech and liberties online, they are used 
interchangeably. Anonymity can either be understood as a means of enabling privacy or 
as a means of undermining it; the former if anonymity is mobilized in a technological form, 
and the latter if privacy is understood in its ontological sense as identity.46 
But anonymity is not equal to privacy. While privacy is about connections and the 
rules of conduct that oversee those connections, anonymity is about disconnecting.47 
According to Julie Ponesse, anonymity does not require complete unknowability, but only 
levels of dissociation. It is dissociability that Ponesse argues defines anonymity relations. 
She suggests, “What distinguishes anonymity relations from privacy relations, therefore, 
is a difference in the way information about a person fails to be known.” 48  Thus, 
anonymity can regulate the circulation of information in a digital environment despite 
control (or consent) mechanisms that are put into place by contractual privacy 
agreements. 
The economics of privacy demonstrate that interests and rewards are enough to 
ensure that people give up their data. From this starting point, anonymizing technologies 
such as Tor, Tails, and Signal49 would interfere with the prevailing economic logic. They 
take as their conceptual starting point that data need not be tracked and collected,50 and 
the continuing debates surrounding the efficacy of their design and the social value of 
their use is a smoke screen intended to distract away from the real threat to information 
stake-holders and those who would stand to benefit financially from the absence of these 
technologies. Nevertheless, the recent rising popularity of anonymizing technologies 
 
44 Robert Bodle, “The Ethics of Online Anonymity or Zuckerberg vs. ‘Moot’,’’ ACM SIGCAS 
Computers and Society 43, no. 1 (2013): 22-35. See also Ian Kerr and Jennifer Barrigar, “Privacy, 
Identity, Anonymity,” in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, ed. Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. 
Haggerty, and David Lyon (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 386-94. 
45 Anonymity must be separated from privacy in this case if privacy is the right to be as Floridi 
argues, for example. 
46 Floridi, “Four Challenges.” 
47 Ponesse, “Navigating the Unknown.” 
48 Ponesse, “Navigating the Unknown,” 330. 
49 The Tor Project: https://www.torproject.org/; Tails: https://tails.boum.org/; Signal: 
https://signal.org/. 
50 Herbert Burkert, “Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision,” in Technology 
and Privacy: The New Landscape, ed. Philip Agre and Marc Rotenberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1997), 125-142. 
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indicates that there is a changing cultural perception of anonymity online, and that it has 
become an aspect of online communication that is worth fighting to keep.51 
However, the point to stress here is that there are dangers to normalizing the 
idea that personal data is a commodity, and a continued focus on privacy as a means of 
controlling access to personal data does very little in addressing the collective concerns 
of data disclosure. Practicing anonymity even on an individual basis addresses these 
concerns more generally and thus works towards a collective solution.  
In summary, the access and control approach in informational privacy discourse 
is a common, but insufficient strategy to respond to the state of personal data collection 
and use today. The access-and-control approach begins with the assumption that there is 
information about us always already circulating with or without our consent or 
awareness, and that as consumers we should be able to control who accesses it and under 
what conditions. If, however, we want to critique the mechanisms of information 
circulation online we have to begin with the opposite assumption, the unavailability of 
personal information, and reconsider how the value of privacy can be seen as a public 
good for which we can be collectively responsible.52 With few exceptions, questioning the 
necessity of personal data collection as an inevitability itself is rare within the literature; 
the initial collection of data, and the assumption to default tracking and recording of 
online movement and behavior seems not to be challenged by many privacy advocates.53  
ANONYMITY AND LAW 
In the early days of the Internet, anonymity was hard-wired into the network architecture 
and protocols. 54  By the end of the twentieth century, growing market pressures to 
identify Internet users in order to target them with advertising created an environment 
whereby anonymous participation was no longer acceptable in an economic framework. 
 
51 Angus Bancroft and Peter Scott Reid, “Challenging the Techno-Politics of Anonymity: The Case 
of Cryptomarket Users,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 4 (2017): 497-512. 
52 Zbigniew Kwecka, William Buchanan, Burkhard Schafer, and Judith Rauhofer, “‘I Am Spartacus’: 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Collaborative Obfuscation and Privacy as A Public Good,” 
Artificial Intelligence Law 22 (2014): 113-139. 
53 As long as Policies and Terms and Conditions are present and intact. Some exceptions to this 
trend can be found in Daniel J. Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other 
Misunderstandings of Privacy,” San Diego Law Review 44, no. 4 (2007): 745-72. See also: 
Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009) and Paul M. Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s Code 
for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices,” 
Wisconsin Law Review 743 (2000): 744–788. 
54 Cole Stryker, Hacking the Future: Privacy, Identity, and Anonymity on the Web (New York, 
London: Overlook Duckworth, 2012). 
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Therefore, anonymity became more closely associated with deviance, and came to 
represent the harmful elements of the Internet in the form of the Dark Web.55 The shift 
in associating anonymity with criminality, rather than with Internet freedoms, both in 
design and in execution, has served to marginalize anonymous technologies and obscure 
the positive aspects of anonymity previously associated with free speech. Today, 
however, anonymity is quickly becoming more and more difficult, if not impossible, for 
pretty much everyone. The reasons for this are social, economic, and political. 
In a social context, a compulsion to interact is altering subjectivity. Constant participation 
on social platforms begins to replace more introspective and self-reflexive methods of 
identity creation. Felix Stalder argues that the postmodern subjectivity is based on 
interaction instead of introspection. In his interpretation, privacy entails a form of 
disconnection in a context in which “sociability is tenuous and needs to be actively 
maintained all of the time.”56 In my view, this kind of sociability sounds more like a threat 
than a promise. Though Stalder’s analysis is convincing and sound, his conclusion lacks a 
critical understanding of sociality as something more than just the default of our 
technological communicative capacities. In his view, privacy reduces to non-participation 
which then signals disconnection, isolation, and loneliness; even worse, irrelevance. This 
is not the first time we have been warned of the “danger” of disconnecting.57 Threats of 
becoming untethered from the network demonstrate exactly the rhetoric of both markets 
and states whose interests remain dependent on the connectivity of subjectivities whose 
continued belief, or acceptance that participation determines identity animates the 
control society thesis. 
In terms of economics, anonymity gets in the way of profit. The move towards 
Persistent User Identities (PUIs), spearheaded by Google and Facebook, is indicative of 
the progressive and aggressive demand for continuous uninterrupted data flows as a 
means of generating revenue. The “identity” which follows you online (your “data 
double”) and which connects your various browsing sessions and access accounts, stands 
in for all of your behavior and activities online. Naming and persistent identities online 
translate into great financial gain through personalization and target marketing, loyalty 
 
55 Eric Jardine, “The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity, and Online Policing,” Global 
Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series (Waterloo, Canada and London, UK: CIGI and 
Chatham House, September 2015). 
56 Felix Stadler, “Autonomy and Control in the Era of Post-Privacy,” Notes & Nodes (blog), June 14, 
2010, http://felix.openflows.com/node/143. 
57 Laura Portwood-Stacer, “Media Refusal and Conspicuous Non-Consumption: The Performative 
and Political Dimensions of Facebook Abstention,” New Media & Society 15, no. 7 (2012): 
1041-1057. 
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accounts, and user product reviews. “Synergistic technologies” make online and offline 
links for tracking by both government and the private sector.58  
Seen through the lens of cyber-security, anonymity does not fare well. The 
political argument here is in order to keep a country’s information infrastructure safe, 
there must be total control over access points and communications. What the Snowden 
files revealed was not only the general security in place to safeguard against the threats 
of terrorist activities, but also the indiscriminate tracking and capture of swaths of citizen 
data without warrant or other legal sanctions. 59  The discourse of security makes it 
dangerous to pursue anonymity as all levels of the law work towards identifying and 
profiling individuals in a preemptive strategy to secure future data requirements. 
Connected to market-based incentives, identification and profiling not only makes 
money, but ostensibly increases the feeling of security. In Canada, though there is no 
equivalent blanket provision for government eavesdropping, there are growing concerns 
with cross-border information sharing, and data legislation is slow in progressing beyond 
market-centered contract-law.60 
Transactional data accounts for most of the relational transactions online 
between consumer and organization. Indeed, it would not be a difficult argument to 
mount that any information exchanged for service involves a transactional expectation. 
Because of this, much privacy legislation is geared towards business and consumer 
relations. In Canada, transactional data are covered by PIPEDA, and in Europe under the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).61 That it involves in many cases, egregious 
amounts of information extraction completely unnecessary to the validity and verity of 
the transaction at hand, is rarely analyzed or challenged. 
Definitionally, anonymity and privacy are complementary concepts. However, in 
terms of information policy, the two concepts function very differently. Privacy legislation 
in Canada and in the United States in particular, has been slow to adapt to the increase in 
data collection, processing, storage, and sharing.62 In some cases, as in the European 
response, modified policies have been enacted to deal with personal information, data 
directives and protections in an attempt to legislate the use of information after it has 
 
58 Michael A. Froomkin, “From Anonymity to Identification,” Journal of Self-Regulation and 
Regulation 1 (2015): 120-138. 
59 Via the U.S Patriot Act (2001). 
60 In Canada, Bill C-51, The Anti-terrorism Act (2015) was superseded by Bill C-59 The Canadian 
National Security Act with some of the more privacy-reducing clauses amended. See Michael 
Geist’s critique online, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/billc59/. 
61 See also https://epic.org/ for the United States. For Europe, https://www.eugdpr.org/; The 
GDPR became law in 2016, but only just came into effect in May 2018.  
62 Dörr, Dieter and Russell L. Weaver, eds. The Right to Privacy in the Light of Media 
Convergence: Perspectives from Three Continents (Berlin and Boston, MA: DeGruyter, 2012), 1-
30. 
15 
 
already been collected. So it is data protection legislation in Europe which governs 
personal data use and storage, though it does not address the context surrounding the 
appropriateness of data collection to begin with.63 In Canada, while  PIPEDA and the 
Privacy Act cover different modes of data and information use, they do not address or 
question the presumption of initial data collection itself.64 
In the United States, anonymity is generally dealt with under the existing privacy 
legislation which is determined under the First Amendment and the Fourth 
Amendment.65 In Canada, there is no general right to anonymity,66 though the Supreme 
Court of Canada has recognized the importance of anonymity as a manifestation of 
informational privacy especially as it relates to online activity.67 In the European Union, 
privacy and data protection rights are covered under the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.68 Importantly, in 
2006 the European Union instituted the “right to be forgotten” which gives citizens the 
ability to contest the existence of information about themselves and demand the removal 
and deletion of pictures, videos, and other information from the Web so that search 
engines will no longer be able to find it.69 
 
63 Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the 
Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy,” in 
Reinventing Data Protection? eds. Poullet Gutwirth, De Hert, de Terwangne and Nouwt 
(Dordecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2009), 45-76. The GDPR does now include some regulation 
concerning “data minimization” outlined in Article 23. 
64 European Commission data protection reform: “The objective of this new set of rules is to give 
citizens back control over of their personal data, and to simplify the regulatory environment 
for business. The data protection reform is a key enabler of the Digital Single Market which the 
Commission has prioritised. The reform will allow European citizens and businesses to fully 
benefit from the digital economy.” (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/index_en.htm); In the United States: 
http://www.informationshield.com/usprivacylaws.html; In Canada: “Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada” http://www.priv.gc.ca  
65 Anita L. Allen, “First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social 
Change,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Symposium: Privacy 
Jurisprudence as an Instrument of Social Change, 14, no. 4 (March 2012): 885–927. 
66 Carole Lucock and Katie Black, “Anonymity and the Law in Canada,” in Lessons from the 
Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy, and Identity in a Networked Society, ed. Ian Kerr, Carole 
Lucock, and Valerie Steeves (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 465-484. 
67 See Krotoszynski, Privacy Revisited, on page 41 referring to the 2012 case of R. v. Spencer. 
68 Antoinette Rouvroy, “Privacy, Data Protection, and the Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient 
Intelligence,” Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2, no. 1 (2008): Article 3. 
69 Rolf Weber, “The Right to Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?” Journal of Intellectual 
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 2 (2011): 120-130. See also David 
Lindsay, “The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law,” in Emerging 
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PRIVACY VERSUS ANONYMITY 
My contention in this article has been that neither privacy notices nor data-protection 
legislation alone adequately address the impelling forces at work in the system of data 
collection, processing, storage and reuse. Beyond policy, privacy and anonymity, when 
considered from sociological and cultural perspectives, are represented differently 
dependent on the context. The choice to reveal or to conceal personal information 
sometimes is a false choice. If the choice is not to reveal, and not to share, that is, if the 
preference is to withhold requested information, this may result in a block to services that 
would otherwise be construed as “free.” To choose to reveal information under these 
circumstances amounts to a kind of “illusion of voluntariness.”70 
The main difference between privacy and anonymity is this: Privacy presumes an 
element of secrecy; Anonymity does not. This might not be immediately obvious, but let 
me attempt an explanation by way of example. X’s communication in order to be private 
must be altered in such a way that something is withheld, most often a name or ID that 
would otherwise link that communication back to something or someone in real life. This 
communication is not meant for everyone. It is not meant to be “public” or publicized. A 
private communication implies trust, secrecy, and control (as confidentiality). X’s 
communication in order to be anonymous does not presume any of the above (agent-
enhancing) requirements. For example, to be anonymous, X does not necessarily withhold 
anything. Rather, there is an absence of something active around X’s communication (ie: 
there are no identifying trackers, monitors, or surveillors, beacons, cookies, etc.) Without 
an ecosystem of watchability and trackability, we find ourselves back in the early days of 
the Internet.  
Anonymous practices are dangerous to those in power. They are threatening to 
the state because they undermine the state’s ability to control its population. They are 
threatening to law enforcement because they impede their ability to manage risk and 
criminality. Anonymous technologies may impede policing’s ability to recognize and name 
potential criminals; to categorize and control minority populations such as the poor, and 
the deviants, the ones who find themselves on the fringes of the information 
marketplace. Conceptually, anonymity extends the privilege of invisibility beyond the 
domain of the elite and the powerful by democratizing identity protections. But 
anonymity adds additional measures of freedom; the freedom of mobility, of speech, of 
association––basic liberties that Western democracies profess to make available to all.  
 
Challenges in Privacy Law: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Normann Witzleb, David Lindsay, 
Moira Paterson, and Sharon (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 290-337. The 
EU’s expanded GDPR has this now firmly entrenched in its legislation. 
70 Simon Davies, “Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a 
Right to a Commodity,” in Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, eds. Philip E. Agre and 
Marc Rotenberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 143-165. 
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Opting for anonymity means understanding what visibility can and cannot 
accomplish. This involves accepting that some contexts make us data vulnerable and 
some contexts make us data powerful, 71  but what determines these contexts are 
frequently beyond the scope of individual users’ ability to identify. 
SUMMARY 
In this section, I summarize the discussion above by highlighting two considerations that 
arise from the privacy defense which ultimately prove to be ineffective in responding to 
surveillance culture. The first consideration has to do with the conflation of privacy with 
data protection, the second has to do with the dependence on notice and consent to 
resist datafication practices. 
1) Privacy is not the same as data-protection  
Despite the fact that many privacy theorists tend to conceptualize informational privacy 
in terms of data protection, the two need to be kept discrete if we are to envision a 
revaluation of privacy in the networked age. 72  Informational privacy, as we have 
understood it thus far in the digital age already entails giving up control of your personal 
information, whether it is through voluntary institutional trust relationships, or as 
commodified transactions. 
Traditionally, privacy has been understood as harm reduction and, therefore, 
defined in terms of negative freedoms (to be left alone). Before the extension of ICTs into 
every facet of our daily lives, there was no universal access that was generally assumed 
through the use of our technologies. Surveillance technologies both enable access to 
services and communication networks, and disable or block access to users from outside 
visibility. Anonymous technologies do not presume, or give the illusion, that your personal 
information is not there. What they do is make it very difficult or impossible to identify or 
trace you. This may be the best means of resistance unless we collectively decide to 
actively stop collecting and storing data. But as we understand in the era of Big Data, this 
seems to be precisely what has captured the attention of both government and the 
private sector. It seems an impossible request. 
 
71 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Law Books, 2009). See also Robert Bodle, “Regimes of Sharing: Open 
APIs, Interoperability, and Facebook,” Information, Communication & Society 14, no. 3 (2011): 
320-337. 
72 Raphaël Gellert and Serge Gutwirth, “Beyond Accountability, the Return to Privacy?” in 
Managing Privacy through Accountability, ed. Daniel Guagnin et al. (London, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2012), 261–283, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137032225_13. See also Rouvroy 
and Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination.” 
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2) Privacy cannot be a control technology  
In our constant interactions online, consent cannot be said to be truly freely given as a 
consequence of choice. Despite what many privacy advocates argue, control does not 
describe the relationship that we have with data. Data is produced, generated (leaves 
traces), mixed, and mobile; wherever we are, wherever we go, we leave digital traces. 
Data is the offspring of our relationship with digital technologies. It is not our property, 
and we do not control access to it. Viewing personal information as property to be 
controlled by the individual allows for the commodification of information and a 
continued illusory view that we can ultimately decide who has access on an individual and 
case by case basis. The flaw in this position becomes clear when considering the outcome 
of this mindset will affect society collectively, and those who otherwise cannot afford to 
be in control of their data would be disadvantaged in other aspects of our social and 
cultural existence.73  
There are also ethical and social implications to consider. The choice of whether 
or not to share personal information affects not just the individual but those associated 
with and informationally tethered to her through the various networks of which she is a 
part. One’s personal choice becomes extended to one’s choosing for another by virtue of 
the network. In other contexts, such as service contracts, one’s choice becomes a false 
choice; an “illusion of voluntariness.”74 Once a critical mass of participation is reached, 
there is no opting out of the system for those who choose not to participate.  
The legal protection of a “reasonable expectation” of privacy has been eroded by 
surveillance technologies, being slowly replaced by a spectrum of general discomfort with 
constant visibility. This normalization of surveillance has allowed for the continuing 
encroachment on public space by surveillance technologies in the interests of security 
and safety. The promises of safety and security make it difficult to argue for the right not 
to be watched. 
The culture of transparency affects certain behaviors and represents a shift in 
thinking that living in an entirely open society is both welcome and desirable. In order to 
sustain this argument, the privacy debate is simplified by reducing complex social, market, 
and state power dynamics to a struggle between the figure of the “citizen” and the 
bureaucratic apparatus in an effort to strike a balance between autonomy and control. 
Ideally, transparency in this context will lead to the power to contest the 
information that is connected to us. The information presented reflects us as individuals 
 
73 Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s Code.” 
74 Davies, “Re-Engineering.” See also the recent privacy studies that have been conducted by 
Queens University and by Ipsis whose findings point to the wide acceptance that choice is 
effectively eliminated. Elia Zureik, Lynda Harling Stalker, Emily Smith, David Lyon, and Yolande 
Chan, Surveillance, Privacy, and the Globalization of Personal Information: International 
Comparisons (Montreal & Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
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in a social network of communication that must be understood as relational and therefore 
not subject to one’s individual control. In some ways this demand has been partially met 
in the “right to be forgotten” legislation, part of the European GDPR.75 
CONCLUSION 
Theories of privacy which take into consideration the psychological, behavioral, legal, and 
philosophical aspects of sociality will reflect the challenges mounted by the individualistic 
responses to privacy harms. A collective understanding of privacy as anonymous relations 
may provoke a more nuanced debate about the nature of informational transactions both 
online and offline. 
It is too soon yet to do away with the legal framework that upholds at least some 
understanding of personal privacy. I am inclined to argue for the “rule of law” as a general 
guide in terms of data collection, use, and storage, with the balanced use of anonymizing 
technologies. This practice must be implemented with restrictions on second use, as well 
as confidentiality, in consumer business transactions and health transactions. The 
problem with teasing out all of these informational levels is that right now, they are all 
for the most part equally treated as types of data informing types of transactions. Arguing 
for more anonymity does not preclude a strong commitment to privacy. The balance to 
be sought is not between individual autonomy and control––but between the power to 
collect personal information and the power to withhold personal information. 
The main purpose of this article was to illustrate the ways in which privacy has 
been distorted and misapplied in the discourse of Internet freedom and the culture of 
surveillance that is quickly normalizing constant visibility and trackability. In response, I 
have illustrated the ways in which anonymity can be conceptualized as a value in order to 
shift the perception that privacy is the only means of defense against surveillance 
enclosures. I argued that informational privacy within the context of surveillance as I 
outlined it in terms of practice, is not successful in effecting a balance in asymmetrical 
power relations if our goal is to empower citizens and consumers. If we believe that 
privacy is about power,76 the current path to challenging the power of corporate and state 
datafication has been unsuccessful, and privacy in this context has arguably become yet 
another commodified resource for both the market and the state.  
The privacy paradox and the expository nature of today’s society seems to signal 
a reduced interest in the efficacy or utility of privacy except when considered as a method 
of controlling and capitalizing on one’s data. If privacy is understood as the right to trade 
 
75 Weber, “The Right to be Forgotten;” Lindsay, “The ‘Right to be Forgotten’.” 
76 As Lisa Austin has insisted in “Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, not Consent (or 
Harm),” in A World Without Privacy: What Law Can and Should Do? ed. Austin Sarat 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131-89. 
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personal information for goods and services, this individual right works against a social or 
collective benefit of equivalent consideration of informational privacy. This in turn 
perpetuates and strengthens the practices of corporate and commercial enterprises to 
withhold the same services and goods from those who would not give up, “trade,” or 
“sell” their information.  
By consenting we are presently sanctioning an environment where privilege and 
economic affluence continues to be rewarded, and non-participation is seen as deviant.77 
If we continue in this vein, we normalize the trading of information for goods, services, 
efficiency and social connectedness. Thus, the withholding or not sharing of information 
will come with an added cost either financially or socially to those who are 
underprivileged or willingly resistant to the transparency regime; either they end up 
paying too much for goods and services, or they lose the privilege to access what could 
be otherwise open and accessible to all. In this case, it is not a matter of infrastructure 
that gets in the way, but personal choice and autonomy that ultimately determines the 
course of the social response. Whereas infrastructure can be affected both by design78 
and legislation at the policy level, this form of social control can lead to more alarming 
and unexpected consequences. 
The defense of privacy seems to be ill-equipped to protect the autonomous agent 
from an excess of data collection. Historically, privacy rights have been invoked to defend 
the individual (to a greater or lesser degree depending on the approach and rationale 
taken) by invoking, or affirming, the values of a neoliberal economic system grounded in 
ownership and control of data. However, a deepening and pervasive surveillance culture 
has made an individual approach untenable. In order to effectively respond to and 
critique the cultural and social acceptance of a post-privacy information ecosystem, I 
maintain that a shift in thinking away from the individual towards a collective 
understanding of the value of privacy will set the stage for a rethinking of the value of 
anonymity.  
  Anonymous relationships, whether human-to-human, human-to-machine, or 
machine-to-machine (in terms of algorithms and protocols), may be better suited to 
defend the individual and society against an increasingly controlling information 
ecosystem. In addition to strengthening privacy protections, presently in the form of data 
accountability, I have suggested that both a technical means of attaining anonymity and 
a legal means of protecting the right to anonymous expression is necessary for cascading 
protections of civil liberties. The social value of anonymity requires greater consideration 
 
77 Michalis Lianos, “Periopticon: Control Beyond Freedom and Coercion—And Two Possible 
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as I believe a collective valuation of anonymity is one viable means of safeguarding 
autonomy and ensuring communicative freedoms, without becoming too transparent. 
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